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Abstract 
 
AGAINST THE ODDS: PRESCHOOLERS, LIKE ADULTS, PREDICT OUTCOMES 
THAT ARE DESIRABLE BUT UNLIKELY 
 
Zachary Hollingsworth Morgan 
B.A., Appalachian State University 
M.A., Appalachian State University 
 
 
Chairperson:  Robyn L. Kondrad, Ph.D. 
 
 
Adults’ expectations for future outcomes are often biased by their desires, a 
phenomenon known as the desirability bias. The current study was the first to investigate 
the desirability bias in 4- and 5-year-old children and adults using a modified version of 
the marked card paradigm. In the paradigm, participants predicted whether a critical card 
would be drawn from decks containing 10 cards. Decks contained one of five different 
ratios of critical to noncritical cards (1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, and 9:1). For some decks, drawing 
a critical card resulted in gaining a reward and in other decks, it resulted in a loss. Results 
revealed that children, like adults, exhibited a desirability bias. Furthermore, children 
showed a stronger bias and were more likely than adults to predict a critical card when 
drawing one resulted in a gain and less likely to do so when it resulted in a loss. Children, 
but not adults, showed a desirability bias for potential losses. Adults tended to use a 
strategy that minimized losses by predicting undesirable outcomes to occur when there 
was a potential loss at stake. Future research should explore the role that the relative 
value of accuracy incentives has on the desirability bias and investigate the presence of 
   
 
v 
 
the bias in infants and older adults in order to gain insight into how and why the strength 
of the desirability bias changes throughout the lifespan.
 
vi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
 
 I would like to offer my deepest thanks to everyone who helped me with this thesis. 
Robyn, thank you for everything you have done from day one (and thanks for everything 
you’ll do in the future while I’m at it). I couldn’t have done any of this, and likely wouldn’t 
have even gotten into developmental research, if it weren’t for you. I look forward to 
continuing to collaborate with you as a researcher and a friend. Also, thanks to my stats guru 
and committee member, Dr. Andrew Smith, as well Dr. Twila Wingrove. You have both 
been enormously influential to my academic career. Thanks to Shauna, for helping me out 
with running participants, to Eva and my grandmother for helping me assemble my materials, 
and to all the adults and children that participated and allowed their children to participate in 
this research. Lastly, I would like to thank the Office of Student Research, the family of 
Wiley F. Smith, and the Graduate Student Association Senate of Appalachian State 
University for helping fund this research as well as my travels.  
  
   
 
vii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Acknowledgments.............................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................... ix 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 3 
The Desirability Bias in Adults....................................................................................... 4 
Advantages of Using the Marked Card Paradigm .......................................................... 9 
Developmental Constructs Related to the DB .............................................................. 12 
Modified Marked Card Paradigm ................................................................................. 20 
The Present Study ......................................................................................................... 24 
Method .............................................................................................................................. 25 
Participants .................................................................................................................... 25 
Design ........................................................................................................................... 25 
Materials ..................................................................................................................... 256 
Procedure ...................................................................................................................... 26 
Results ............................................................................................................................... 31 
Hypothesis 1: Children’s Desirability Bias................................................................... 32 
Hypothesis 2: Comparison of the Desirability Bias in Children and Adults ................ 34 
Additional Findings ...................................................................................................... 37 
Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 38 
   
 
viii 
 
References ......................................................................................................................... 55 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................... 67 
Vita .................................................................................................................................... 68 
  
   
 
ix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. Desirability Bias .................................................................................................65 
Figure 2. Sensitivity to Frequency .....................................................................................66 
Running head: AGAINST THE ODDS  1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Against the Odds: Preschoolers, like Adults, Predict Outcomes  
that are Desirable But Unlikely 
Zachary H. Morgan 
Appalachian State University 
AGAINST THE ODDS  2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Adults’ expectations for future outcomes are often biased by their desires, a 
phenomenon known as the desirability bias. The current study was the first to investigate 
the desirability bias in 4- and 5-year-old children and adults using a modified version of 
the marked card paradigm. In the paradigm, participants predicted whether a critical card 
would be drawn from decks containing 10 cards. Decks contained one of five different 
ratios of critical to noncritical cards (1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, and 9:1). For some decks, drawing 
a critical card resulted in gaining a reward and in other decks, it resulted in a loss. Results 
revealed that children, like adults, exhibited a desirability bias. Furthermore, children 
showed a stronger bias and were more likely than adults to predict a critical card when 
drawing one resulted in a gain and less likely to do so when it resulted in a loss. Children, 
but not adults, showed a desirability bias for potential losses. Adults tended to use a 
strategy that minimized losses by predicting undesirable outcomes to occur when there 
was a potential loss at stake. Future research should explore the role that the relative 
value of accuracy incentives has on the desirability bias and investigate the presence of 
the bias in infants and older adults in order to gain insight into how and why the strength 
of the desirability bias changes throughout the lifespan.
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Against the Odds: Preschoolers, like Adults, Predict Outcomes 
that are Desirable but Unlikely 
Having a preference makes it difficult to make unbiased predictions about future 
outcomes. For example, adults tend to bet on their preferred sports team to win even 
when they know the odds are against them (Babad, 1987), and expect their preferred 
politician to be elected even if they are behind in the polls (Krizan, Miller, & Johar, 
2010). Adults’ predictions are biased by their desires even when they are explicitly told 
to be objective (e.g., Babad & Katz, 1991), incentivized to be accurate (e.g., Irwin & 
Graae, 1968), when they know the odds are against them (e.g., Krizan et al., 2010), and 
when they have read scientific evidence pointing to the contrary (e.g., Bastardi, Uhlmann, 
& Ross, 2011). The idea that people’s desires influence their expectations about a future 
outcome is called the desirability bias (DB).  
The link between preferences and expectations is a well-documented phenomenon 
in social psychology (Babad, 1987; Granberg & Brent, 1983; Hayes, 1936; Lee, 
Frederick, & Ariely, 2006; Windschitl, Smith, Rose, & Krizan, 2010), but despite 
speculation about why the DB might exist (see Windschitl et al., 2010), there has been 
little exploration of its ontogenesis. The primary goals of the present study were to 
examine whether young children, like adults, exhibit a DB, and to compare the strength 
of the DB in children and adults. The first section of the introduction reviews studies that 
use the marked card paradigm to measure the DB in adults, the second section outlines 
relevant developmental literature, and the third describes the modified marked card 
paradigm that was created for the current study to measure the DB in both children and 
adults. 
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The Desirability Bias in Adults 
Adults have been found to show a DB in studies that have used certain games of 
chance (Windschitl et al., 2010). A card-drawing task known as the marked card 
paradigm is particularly effective at detecting the bias (Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; 
Crandall, Solomon, & Kellaway, 1955; Irwin, 1953; Marks, 1951, Windschitl et al., 
2010). In the marked card paradigm, participants are asked to predict whether a particular 
type of card, called the critical card, will be randomly drawn from a deck made up of two 
types of cards. Participants first learn how many cards in a deck are critical, and that 
drawing one of the critical cards will result in either a gain or loss of money. They are 
also told that they are able to gain a small amount of money for accurately predicting 
which card is drawn. After this, participants predict which card, critical or noncritical, 
will be drawn. Ideally, predictions should be based on probability: the more critical cards 
there are in a deck, the greater the chance of drawing one. Based on expected value, if 
more than 50% of the cards are critical, the optimal prediction is always to guess that a 
critical card will be drawn.  
In reality, participants are biased to predict desirable outcomes. If drawing a 
critical card automatically results in a positive outcome (i.e., gaining a point), participants 
tend to predict that a critical card will be drawn even when this is the objectively 
suboptimal choice. For example, in a deck containing four critical and six noncritical 
cards, the optimal prediction (i.e., the prediction with the greatest expected value) is that 
a noncritical card will be drawn. However, if drawing a critical card is desirable because 
it results in a gain of money or points, then adults tend to predict that a critical card will 
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be drawn (Windschitl et al., 2010). In other words, adults’ predictions are based more on 
their desired outcome than on the optimal outcome.  
The strength of a DB that is elicited using the marked card paradigm can be 
influenced by a number of factors. Of interest for this study are the frequency of critical 
to noncritical cards, the use of accuracy incentives, and the degree of control participants 
believe they have over the drawn card (i.e., the illusion of control).  
Frequency of critical and noncritical cards. The number of critical and 
noncritical cards in a deck can influence the strength of the DB. The smaller the 
difference in the frequency of critical versus noncritical cards in a deck, the more likely it 
is that adults’ desires will influence their predictions. For instance, in a deck with three 
critical and seven noncritical cards the optimal prediction is always that a noncritical card 
will be drawn. But when the critical card is associated with a reward, adults predict a 
critical card to be drawn between 15% and 30% of the time (Crandall et al., 1955; Irwin, 
1953; Irwin & Metzger, 1966; Windschitl et al., 2010, study1). In contrast, when the 
difference in frequency is greater, such as with one critical and nine noncritical cards, 
adults are less likely to base their predictions on the desirability of the critical card. For a 
deck with this frequency, it is also optimal to always predict a noncritical card to be 
drawn, and adults do so between 90% and 100% of the time (Crandall et al., 1955; Irwin, 
1953; Irwin & Metzger, 1966). 
Interestingly, there is no optimal prediction in decks with equal numbers of 
critical and noncritical cards (5:5); the expected value is the same regardless of which 
type of card is predicted. Adults’ predictions in this circumstance reflect the value of a 
critical card. When a critical card is associated with a gain, adults are likely to predict that 
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one will be drawn and when it represents a loss, adults are unlikely to predict one to be 
drawn (Crandall et al., 1955; Irwin & Metzger, 1966; Windschitl et al., 2010). Thus, the 
5:5 ratio provides a baseline measure for the degree to which adults’ predictions are 
influenced by desire when probability provides no directional information for making a 
prediction.  
The opposite relationship is examined through the use of a neutral condition, in 
which neither the critical nor the noncritical cards are given a value. The neutral 
condition provides a baseline measure of participants’ sensitivity to frequency 
information when there is no desirability information provided. In it, participants are 
rewarded only for making an accurate prediction. Because the critical card is not made 
more or less desirable than noncritical cards, predictions should be based on whatever is 
the optimal outcome given the odds ratio. Having a baseline condition for each ratio also 
provides a way to determine whether adults are influenced differently by desirable 
outcomes than by undesirable outcomes.  
Comparing the difference between the neutral condition and the reward conditions 
is an interesting assessment because there is abundant literature that suggests that adults 
are more sensitive to losses than they are to gains (Harbaugh, Krause, & Vesterlund, 
2002; Johnson, Herrmann, & Terry, 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Kahneman, 
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Steelandt, Broihanne, R omain, Thierry, & Dufour, 2013; Tom, 
Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). People who lose money if they fail to reach a weight loss 
goal, for example, are more likely to actually shed pounds than are those who earn money 
for achieving the same goal (Driver & Hensrud, 2013). In past research on the DB, 
however, adults were equally influenced by both consequences – they overpredicted 
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desirable outcomes to about the same extent in the gain and loss conditions compared to a 
neutral condition. (Irwin, 1953; Irwin & Metzger, 1966; Irwin & Snodgrass, 1966; 
Windschitl et al., 2010, study 1).  
Accuracy incentives. Some studies using the marked card paradigm have 
provided participants with incentives for making accurate predictions (Irwin & Metzger, 
1966; Windschitl et al., 2010), whereas others have not (Irwin, 1953; Morlock & Hertz, 
1964). A meta-analysis of 27 individual studies showed that accuracy incentives 
produced effect sizes that were not significantly different from those of studies that did 
not use accuracy incentives (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007b). In other words, giving 
incentives for making accurate predictions did not appear to influence the strength of the 
DB in the participants from the included studies.  
Despite evidence suggesting that accuracy incentives do not have a big impact on 
eliciting the DB, there are some good arguments to be made for including these 
incentives. Importantly, the conclusions drawn from the meta-analysis mentioned above 
are limited because the authors included studies that used procedures other than the 
marked card paradigm. Furthermore, because of the small sample, Krizan and Windschitl 
(2007b) considered studies that stressed the importance of accuracy in the paradigm 
instructions and studies that provided monetary incentives as one category. On the one 
hand, it is not clear whether a physical incentive like money has a different effect than an 
instructional incentive. On the other hand, including an incentive of any type does not 
appear to limit the ability to detect a DB.  
The advantage of including an accuracy incentive is that it makes interpreting the 
responses clearer. Imagine a participant who predicts a desirable card when there is only 
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a 10% chance of it being drawn. If there is no incentive for making an accurate 
prediction, then the participant is not risking losing out on that point (because it is not 
likely that a critical card will actually be drawn). In other words, there is no strategic 
reason to not predict the unlikely but desirable critical card. But when accuracy 
incentives are included, then the participant has to decide whether to risk not getting the 
reward for accuracy. Thus, if a DB is detected even with an accuracy incentive, then it is 
clear that participants are swayed by their desires.  
Illusion of control. Another factor that can influence the strength of the DB is 
when people incorrectly believe that they have some control over an unknown future 
outcome, a phenomenon called the illusion of control (Langer, 1975). Some scholars 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between the illusion of control and the 
strength of the DB: If participants in the marked card paradigm believe they have some 
control over what card is drawn from a deck, then they are even more likely to predict 
improbable but desirable outcomes (i.e., they show a stronger DB; Langer & Roth, 1975).  
Other researchers argue instead that the illusion of control is distinct from and 
uncorrelated with the DB. In one study, participants either drew the cards themselves or 
an experimenter did so. Although participants who “controlled” drawing the cards 
reported being more confident about their predictions, both groups demonstrated an 
equally robust DB (Budescu & Bruderman, 1995, study 1). The participants’ illusion of 
control eventually disappeared as they made more predictions, but they continued to 
show a DB. In fact, studies have found a DB when the illusion of control was removed 
altogether by having an experimenter or a computer program randomly draw the cards for 
each deck (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007b; Windschitl et al., 2010). These findings suggest 
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that, in adults, the DB is not diminished when participants could potentially have the 
illusion of control over random outcomes.  
Advantages of Using the Marked Card Paradigm 
 For the present study, a child-friendly version of the marked card paradigm was 
created to measure the DB in children and adults. This procedure was chosen because it 
has proven to be more reliable than other procedures at eliciting a DB in adults (e.g., Bar-
Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Bar-Hillel, Budescu, & Amar, 2008; Pruitt & Hoge, 1965; 
Windschitl et al., 2010). There are two main reasons why the marked card paradigm 
consistently detects a DB: First, participants make discrete outcome predictions rather 
than likelihood judgments and second, participants make predictions about stochastic 
(chance) rather than non-stochastic outcomes.  
Discrete outcome prediction vs. likelihood judgment. In the marked card 
paradigm, participants are asked to make discrete outcome predictions. That is, they 
make a prediction about which of two types of cards will be drawn. When participants are 
asked to provide a probability estimate of how likely a given outcome is to occur by 
providing a percentage out of 100 instead of a dichotomous prediction, the DB disappears 
(e.g., Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995; Pruitt & Hoge, 1965). For example, in one study 
participants were shown a grid of black and white cells and were asked to estimate the 
probability of randomly drawing one of the colors (Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995, Study 
1). For some trials, drawing the predetermined critical color was associated with a gain, 
and for other trials it was associated with a loss. A DB would exist if participants gave 
higher likelihood judgments when a card resulted in a gain than when it resulted in a loss. 
Unlike with the marked card paradigm, a DB was not detected using this task; 
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participants’ estimates did not differ, regardless of the prospect of a gain or a loss, and 
were closely aligned with optimal predictions based on probability.  
Why might the DB disappear when using likelihood estimates? Some researchers 
have theorized that likelihood judgments may lead participants to develop an expectation 
that the experimenter intends to measure their knowledge of probability (Krizan & 
Windschitl, 2007b). This expectation could inflate participants’ reliance on probability 
information when making their estimates, reducing their reliance on desirability 
information and their overall DB. Regardless of the process involved, research using 
likelihood estimates has shown that this type of decision is not optimal for eliciting a DB. 
Stochastic vs. nonstochastic outcomes. The second reason that the marked card 
paradigm elicits the DB more consistently than other paradigms is because it involves 
making predictions about stochastic outcomes. Stochastic outcomes are ones that occur 
randomly such as a dice roll or, in this case, a random card draw. Nonstochastic 
outcomes, in contrast, are not random (e.g., the answer to a multiple choice question) and 
are unlikely to elicit a DB (Bar-Hillel & Budescu, study 2, study 4; Krizan & Windschitl, 
2007b; Windschitl et al., 2010, study 2).   
One theory to explain this difference, referred to as the biased-guessing account 
(Windschitl et al., 2010), suggests that the DB becomes increasingly pronounced when 
participants rely more on guessing than on objective information (Windschitl et al., 
2010). To illustrate this point, in decks with a 5:5 critical to noncritical card ratio, the 
objective probability information is not helpful because there is an equal chance of either 
type of card being drawn. In this case, participants must guess about which outcome will 
occur, and their guesses tend to align with the more desirable outcome. Furthermore, 
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when participants are specifically encouraged to trust their intuition, the DB is enhanced 
(the opposite is also true – when guessing is discouraged, the DB is reduced; Windschitl 
et al., 2010, study 5). In other words, when participants are encouraged to guess or are 
forced to guess because objective evidence is not available, the DB is more pronounced.  
In contrast, the bias is less pronounced as the deck frequencies becomes more 
differentiated and the uncertainty about the outcome is reduced, as in the 1:9 or 3:7 ratios 
used in the marked card paradigm (Crandall et al., 1955; Irwin, 1953). For these ratios, 
participants are more likely to base their predictions on the probability associated with 
drawing either card, and the DB is diminished (Bar-Hillel & Budescu, 1995, Study 1; 
Pruitt & Hoge, 1965). The DB is reduced for a similar reason when participants make 
predictions about non-stochastic trivia questions (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007b; 
Windschitl et al., 2010, study 2). When adults are told that they can gain money for 
correctly answering a trivia question (e.g., which animal is louder - A bear or a lion?) and 
that they can also gain money simply for one of the two answers being correct, they are 
only swayed by the arbitrary desirability of one of the answers if they are clueless as to 
what the correct answer might be. For a question that is somewhat familiar to participants 
such as the one above, most participants will be swayed on way or the other by past 
knowledge or inference. This type of question, therefore, typically leads to participants 
focusing less on the desirability of the critical card. This explanation is further supported 
by the fact that the DB returns when the trivia questions are extremely difficult and 
unfamiliar to the majority of people (Windschitl et al., 2010, study 3). In summary, a DB 
is most easily detected through the use of discrete outcome predictions about stochastic 
events.  
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Developmental Constructs Related to the DB 
 Though a number of studies have examined the DB in adults, none have explored 
its ontogenesis. There has only been one study to measure the DB in children (Marks, 
1951). This study was the first to use the marked card paradigm. A DB was detected in 
children in the study, however the youngest participants were only 9-years-old and there 
was no adult group for comparison.  
A direct comparison between the children in Marks’ (1951) study and adults in 
later studies is difficult because more current studies used slightly different versions of 
the marked card paradigm than did Marks. Specifically, three methodological concerns 
limit the conclusions that can be drawn about children from Marks’ early study. First, 
Marks did not provide accuracy incentives. Although accuracy incentives have been 
shown to minimally influence the way adults make predictions, the same may not be true 
for children. Second, a neutral condition was not included so it was impossible to 
determine whether the DB was stronger when children faced a potential gain compared to 
a potential loss. And third, the noncritical cards used in Marks’ study were blank instead 
of containing a distinct pattern. Research suggests that this procedure might bias 
predictions towards the critical, non-blank card (Windschitl et al., 2010). To avoid this 
bias, the marked card paradigm is now conducted using two distinct cards (e.g., a red and 
a blue) for each deck with the critical and noncritical cards randomly selected between 
the two types. Thus, the Marks (1951) study provides a starting point for exploring the 
ontogenesis of the DB, but leaves room for more research with younger participants and 
with a modified paradigm that addresses these potential issues.  
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 The following sections will provide a brief review of evidence from the 
developmental literature that supports the hypotheses that preschool-age children will 
show a DB, and will be more influenced by desirability than adults. The first section 
explains that children are even more optimistic about future events than are adults 
(Lockhart, Chang, & Story, 2002; Schuster, Ruble, & Weinert, 1998), the second shows 
that, like adults, preschoolers make little distinction between desired outcomes and 
expected outcomes (Babad, 1987; Hayes, 1936; Lipko, Dunlosky, & Merriman, 2009, 
study 1; Schneider, 1998), and the third shows that children weigh positive information 
that confirms what they want to believe more heavily than they do negative, 
disconfirming information (Boseovski, 2010; Rholes & Ruble, 1986; Stipek, Roberts, & 
Sanborn, 1984). Evidence from these three fields of study suggests that children will be 
even more likely than adults to be swayed by the desirability of outcomes even though 
they are capable of understanding concepts related to frequency and probability 
differences (Denison & Xu, 2010b; Kushnir, Xu, & Wellman, 2010; Xu & Garcia, 2008).   
Overoptimism. The DB is a form of a broader construct known as overoptimism. 
Someone might be overly optimistic if, for example, they have special knowledge or 
experiences that influence their expectations about the future. This is different from the 
DB, for which someone’s predictions are specifically influenced by the desire for a 
particular outcome and not by any other subjective influences. Adults, for instance, tend 
to be overly optimistic about how healthy they will be in the future compared to the 
average person (Rothman, Klein, & Weinstein, 1996). This would be an example of a DB 
only if this optimism resulted from the desire to be healthier than others; it would be 
general overoptimism if they think they will be healthier because of the knowledge that 
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they eat healthier and exercise more than the average person. Similarly, adults who 
overestimate how long their romantic relationships will last are demonstrating 
overoptimism if their estimation is based off of the length of a previous relationship and a 
DB if it is based off of their desire to stay with their current partner (Buehler, Griffin, & 
Ross, 1995).  
Although adults are clearly overly optimistic in a variety of circumstances, they 
are more realistic than children when making predictions about the outcome of future 
events (Boseovski, 2012; Droege & Stipek, 1993; Lockhart et al., 2002; Ross & Levy, 
1958; Schuster et al., 1998, study 1). For example, in one study 5- and 6-year-olds, 7- to 
9-year-olds, and adults were told about a 5- or 10-year-old storybook character who had 
an undesirable characteristic (i.e., was messy, excessively freckled, missing a finger) and 
who really “wished” to change this trait in a positive direction (e.g., “wished she could be 
neater/had no freckles/had five fingers;” Lockhart et al., 2002). When asked if the 
storybook characters would, by the age of 21, “continue to show the extreme negative 
trait,” “become more like everyone else,” or “change in the opposite, more positive 
direction,” 5- to 6-year-olds were more likely to predict that the character would undergo 
a positive change, whereas 7- to 9-year-olds and adults were more realistic and tended to 
predict that the characters would continue to show the negative trait or become more like 
everyone else. Young children were optimistic even when the outcome was an impossible 
one, like growing a new finger.  
This method measured overoptimism more generally, and not necessarily a DB. 
This is because participants could have based their predictions on factors unrelated to the 
DB, such as past experience (e.g., knowing a messy friend who became more organized) 
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or special knowledge (e.g., knowing that a lizard can grow back its tail). Additionally, the 
participants were making predictions about storybook characters whose fate had no 
implication for themselves. Previous research has suggested that the DB is diminished in 
circumstances where the loss or gain is not relevant to the person making predictions 
(Price, 2000; Stipek et al., 1984). Finally, the predictions made were about a long-term 
future outcome, rather than a short-term one. Research with adults has suggested that 
predictions about outcomes far into the future tend to be more extreme and exaggerated 
than predictions made about outcomes in the immediate future (Buehler & McFarland, 
2001; Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; Wilson & Gilbert, 2005). It 
is possible that children’s predictions are also more extreme or exaggerated when 
thinking about long-term, rather than immediate outcomes. Nevertheless, this study 
suggests that preschoolers are more optimistic than adults, and supports the hypothesis 
that they may be more influenced by desirable outcomes than adults in a task that 
measures the DB.  
In summary, young children, like adults, are overly optimistic in a variety of 
circumstances and, at least in some contexts, are even more optimistic about future 
outcomes than adults. Because overoptimism represents a more general concept 
compared to the more specific DB, the results of these studies suggest that children, like 
adults, will exhibit a DB. Just as they are more optimistic than adults, preschoolers may 
also be more willing to optimistically accept poor odds in favor of betting on a desired 
outcome in the marked card paradigm.  
Desire-expectation differences. The DB occurs when people’s expectations are 
shaped by their preferences. Overly optimistic predictions about future outcomes are less 
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likely when people more accurately discriminate between what they should expect to 
occur and what they would like to occur. Adults are able to discriminate between these 
two factors in some situations, as demonstrated by the lack of a DB in the 1:9 ratio in the 
marked card paradigm. Here, they might desire the critical card to be drawn, but it is 
clear that this is not what they expect to occur. Under certain circumstances, however, 
adults are not as accurate as they could be in recognizing the distinction between 
preferences and expectations. Their desires and expectations are strongly correlated 
when, for instance, they expect their desired candidate to win in political elections 
(Hayes, 1936), expect their desired sports team to win a game (Babad, 1987), and expect 
their financial investments to pay off as desired (Olsen, 1997). 
Young children, like adults, do not tend to differentiate their desires from their 
expectations (Lipko et al., 2009, study 1; Schneider, 1998). In one study, for instance, 
researchers asked half of a group of 4- and 6-year-old children to place a flag either 
where they wished to land in a long-jumping game, and asked the other half to place it 
where they expected to land (Schneider, 1998). Here, flag placements made by the “wish” 
and “expectation” groups differed for the 6-year-olds, but not for 4-year-olds. In a 
separate study, 4- and 5-year-olds also failed to differentiate between their desires and 
expectations in a memory task using 10 colored pictures (Lipko et al., 2009, study 1). 
When asked how many pictures they thought they would be able to remember, children 
expected to remember an average of three more pictures than they actually could. These 
results, related to children’s inflated expectations, suggest that young children often fail 
to differentiate what they expect to happen from what they want to happen. This finding 
supports the presence of a DB in children; if they are unable to separate their desires from 
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expectations, then they will likely disregard probability information when it does not 
align with the most desirable outcome.  
 It is important to recognize that the tasks used in these studies did not measure the 
DB. Instead, children were asked to make predictions about their abilities, which can be 
influenced by subjective factors like perceived skill and past experience rather than just 
desire and objective information. Also, neither study mentioned included incentives for 
accurately predicting performance, which might have influenced children’s expectations. 
Thus, although the correlation between preschoolers’ desires and expectations supports 
the hypothesis that children will show a stronger DB than adults, a task specifically 
tailored to measuring the DB is necessary to support this claim.  
Bias in social judgments. Further support that children might exhibit a DB 
comes from research on social judgment and decision-making. Preschoolers have a 
positivity bias when making personality judgments about others (see Boseovski, 2010 for 
a review). That is, they have a “people are good” mindset (see Kalish, 2002) that 
influences how they process behavioral information when making personality judgments.  
Because they want to believe the best about other people, they require less 
evidence that someone is nice to make a positive trait attribution about them than 
evidence that someone is mean to make a negative attribution (Boseovski & Lee, 2006, 
2008; Rholes & Ruble, 1986). Preschoolers have been shown to downplay extensive 
knowledge about an individual’s past behavior in order to make a positive trait 
attribution, judging someone positively from a single instance of positive behavior, even 
if there were three prior instances of negative behavior (Rholes & Ruble, 1986). In fact, it 
takes at least five instances of negative behavior before children are willing to believe 
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that the individual is a “bad person” (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). In other words, children 
selectively attend to information that aligns with what they expect of other people. In the 
framework of the marked card paradigm, children could selectively attend to information 
that aligns with their positive expectations. And since children are not good at 
differentiating their expectations from their desires, this selective attention to the 
desirable information would likely increase the strength of the DB.  
Children’s optimistic mentality also influences their predictions about how other 
people will behave in the future. They predict that someone who wants to make positive 
behavioral change will be able to do so, but will not be able to make negative changes 
(e.g., Heyman & Giles, 2004; Lockhart et al., 2002). For instance, 7-year-olds learned 
about a character that was nice or mean, but wanted to behave in the opposite way. The 
children claimed that mean characters could learn to be nice, but that nice characters 
could not learn to be mean even if that is what they wanted. Thus, children do not tend to 
make predictions that conflict with the belief that people are good.  
Another way of thinking about the positivity bias is that young children will do 
just about anything to make facts conform to their “people are good” mentality, even if 
the objective evidence suggests otherwise. This mentality in children relates to the DB 
because it suggests that children may be willing to disregard probability information in 
favor of their desires when making decisions about the future. Furthermore, their 
decreased sensitivity to negative information may lead to children focusing more on 
desirable outcomes than undesirable ones, which would lead to a DB in the marked card 
paradigm. 
AGAINST THE ODDS  19 
 
 
 
 Numeracy. Although a DB exists even when probability information is 
ambiguous, as in the 5:5 critical to noncritical card ratio, it also can be elicited in 
instances when the probability information clearly points to an optimal prediction that is 
different from the desired one, as in the 4:6 ratio. Results from the marked card paradigm 
are interesting because they show that adults base their predictions on desire even when 
they stand to gain more from basing them on probability. In the modified version of the 
marked card paradigm created for the present study, children are asked to compare 
desirability and probability information to make predictions. The ability to work with and 
understand numbers and probability, a concept known as numeracy, is necessary when 
making such a comparison. 
Basic probability understanding has been documented in children as young as 
eight months of age (Xu & Garcia, 2008), and has been consistently reported in older 
infants and toddlers (Denison & Xu, 2010a, 2010b; Kushnir et al., 2010; Ma & Xu, 
2011). For example, 14-month-old children used probability to determine where to search 
for their favorite type of lollipop. Infants saw two jars of lollipops, one with a 1:3 ratio of 
desirable to undesirable lollipops and one with a 3:1 ratio. An experimenter took one 
lollipop from each jar and, without revealing the type of lollipop, placed each one into 
two opaque cups, and invited infants to choose one of the two cups. The children nearly 
always searched in the cup where the experimenter had placed the lollipop she drew from 
the jar that contained more desirable lollipops (Denison & Xu, 2010b). Thus, even before 
they can talk, children can use basic probability information to guide their decision-
making.  
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Preschoolers also use probability to make inferences about their environments 
(Kushnir & Gopnik, 2005). In one study, 4-year-olds were shown two blocks that could 
either activate or fail to activate a detector (a toy that lit up and played music) when 
placed on top of it (Kushnir & Gopnik, 2005, study 1). For each trial, both blocks were 
placed upon the detector three times and the number of times each block activated the 
detector was manipulated. Thus, children could see the general likelihood that each block 
would activate the detector. After this, participants were asked to “pick the best one to 
make it go.”  When children saw block A activate the detector three out of three times, 
they were much more likely to pick it over block B when block B only activated the 
detector one out of three times. This trend of making decisions based on probability was 
found for all trials that did not present ambiguous or conflicting information, showing 
that 4-year-olds are able to use probability to make decisions about future outcomes.  
The evidence related to young children’s numeracy suggests that they are 
sensitive to basic probabilities, and can use such information to make predictions and 
inform their behavioral decisions. Preschool-age children, therefore, should not have 
difficulty understanding the differences in critical to noncritical card ratios between 
decks. They should be able to understand that there are more of some cards than others, 
and that the more frequent cards are more likely to be drawn. The question of interest, 
however, is whether their predictions will be based more on this frequency information or 
on their desires.  
Modified Marked Card Paradigm 
 The DB has never been investigated in preschool-age children. This study aims to 
measure the DB in children and to compare the strength of the DB in children and adults 
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through the use of a child-friendly version of the marked card paradigm. There are three 
aspects of the traditional paradigm that the modified version created for the present study 
addresses in order to make the task appropriate for children: Cognitive load, attention 
span, and type of incentive.  
 Recall that, in the adult version of the marked card paradigm, participants are 
asked to predict whether a critical card will be drawn from a deck. Participants are first 
offered an incentive to be accurate. They are then told how many cards in a deck are 
critical cards and whether drawing one will result in either a gain or loss of money (or, in 
the neutral condition, that there is no value associated with the critical card). Finally, 
participants predict whether the critical card will be drawn. There are 10 trials for each of 
three conditions (a gain, loss, and neutral condition) randomly presented across a total of 
30 trials.   
Cognitive load. The traditional marked card paradigm is associated with a high 
cognitive load. That is, participants are asked to remember several different rules (e.g., 
critical card frequency, critical card value, and accuracy incentive) simultaneously. The 
task is further complicated because the rules change depending on the type of trial (e.g., 
sometimes participants gain points/stickers and sometimes they lose points/stickers for 
drawing a critical card). As it is, the task requires sophisticated working memory and 
executive functioning skills, which are much less developed in 4- to 5-year-old children 
than in adults (see Carlson, Moses, & Breton, 2002; Case, Kurland, & Goldberg, 1982; 
Marcovitch, Boseovski, & Knapp, 2007). Therefore, a primary goal of the modifications 
was to reduce the cognitive demand of the marked card paradigm without compromising 
its ability to detect a DB. 
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In the version of the paradigm used for the current study, the differentiation of 
critical and noncritical cards was simplified. The two cards differed by a single 
dimension (color: green and yellow) rather than by two dimensions (e.g., color and shape: 
green circles and yellow squares). There were also several changes made to simplify the 
procedure. The first was that test trials were block randomized by condition rather than 
fully randomized across all 30 trials. Participants completed 10 trials for a single 
condition before moving on to the next set of 10 trials for the next condition. Previous 
experiments with adults randomized the desirability condition (gain, neutral, or loss) 
associated with each deck on a per-trial basis. Thus, the desirability of the critical card 
could change from one deck to the next. Having the desirability condition remain the 
same for 10 trials in a row made it easier for children to remember and use this 
information when making their predictions. 
A second procedural change was that the colors used to differentiate the critical 
and noncritical cards were changed after the first five trials for each condition. Previous 
studies used different types of cards for each deck. Fewer changes made the task less 
cognitively taxing for young children. 
Lastly, participants went through three practice trials before completing the test 
trials for each condition. These trials allowed them to learn about the accuracy incentive 
and desirability information separately (first two practice trials), before combining both 
rules in the third practice trial. The experimenter also provided participants with a visual 
reminder (a reference sheet) during these trials to help explain each rule. Both rules were 
repeated to participants before every test trial. All together, these modifications helped to 
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ensure that children were able to keep all of the pertinent information in mind when 
making predictions. 
Attention span. One concern was that the marked card paradigm would be 
challenging to administer to young children due to their limited attention spans. 
Preschoolers have been found to have small capacities for sustained attention with a great 
deal of variability between participants (see Klenberg, Korkman, & Lahti-Nuuttila, 
2001). The following modifications were made to help keep children engaged and 
attentive. 
The marked card paradigm is typically computerized for adults who watch as 
information is displayed on a computer monitor, and then make predictions by clicking 
one of two options. In the child-friendly paradigm, participants interacted with an 
experimenter who used real decks of cards. Research has shown that children learn better 
from live, in-person interactions with real objects than they do from nonphysical 
interactions, like videos (e.g., the “video deficit” effect; Anderson & Pempek, 2005). 
Thus, the modified paradigm was presented using actual cards in order to help children 
focus.  
Along with this change, two other procedural modifications were used to help 
keep children’s attention. First, the opportunity to take a break was given after every fifth 
trial (when the experimenter switches to the next set of cards) as well every tenth trial 
(when the experimenter explains the rules for the next condition). In addition, the 
experimenter allowed children to do a short physical activity (e.g., “Let’s stand up and do 
some jumping jacks”) if they were especially distracted or fatigued.  
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Type of incentive. The monetary or point-based incentives typically used in the 
traditional version of the marked card paradigm were not appropriate for young children, 
who have a limited knowledge about the concept of money (see Berti & Bombi, 1981 for 
a review) and may not have any use for money themselves. Therefore, stickers were used 
as an incentive for children, which have been used successfully in previous studies (e.g., 
Jaswal, Croft, Setia, & Cole, 2010; Liu, Vanderbilt, & Heyman, 2013; Palmquist, Burns 
& Jaswal, 2012). Points that accumulated and could be exchanged for candy were used as 
an incentive for adults. Candy has been used as a successful motivator in previous studies 
for adults (Heyman & Ariely, 2004). 
The Present Study 
Adults consistently show a DB when making predictions about uncertain future 
outcomes (Crandall et al., 1955; Irwin, 1953; Irwin & Metzger, 1966; Windschitl et al., 
2010). To date, one study has explored whether children also exhibit this bias (Marks, 
1951), but no research has attempted to measure the bias in preschoolers. One reason for 
this gap is because there is currently no paradigm to measure the DB that is appropriate 
for this age group. Therefore, the goals of the present study were to measure the DB in 4- 
and 5-year-old children using a child-friendly version of the marked card paradigm, and 
to compare the strength of the DB in children versus adults. Because children are overly 
optimistic in a variety of contexts, fail to differentiate between their desires and 
expectations, and are biased to neglect probability information in favor of their positive 
desires, it was hypothesized that 4-and 5-year-olds would exhibit a stronger DB than 
adults.  
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Method 
Participants 
 A total of 120 participants was used for this study: 30 4-year-old children (M = 
55.1 months), 30 5-year-old children (M = 64 months) and 60 adult college students (M = 
20.0 years). Equal numbers of males and females were recruited for both age groups. A 
statistical power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009) 
determined that a total sample of at least 110 would be required to detect the largest 
interaction effect of interest (f(V) = .25, α = .05, β = .95). Children were recruited from 
local preschools that agreed to participate and from a local community database made up 
of community members who agreed to be contacted about participating in research. 
Adults were recruited from the psychology participant recruit system. They participated 
to fulfill a course requirement and received candy for participating. Children received 
stickers and a small thank-you gift (e.g., a ball, t-shirt). Both the adult and child samples 
were primarily white and middle-class. Two 4-year-old children were excluded because 
they did not complete at least half of the test trials. 
Design 
 This study used a 3 (Desirability: gain, loss, neutral) x 5 (Frequency: 1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 
6:4, 9:1) x 2 (Age group: children, adults) within-subjects design with age group as a 
between-subjects factor. The dependent variable was whether participants predicted a 
critical card to be drawn.  
 All participants completed a total of 30 test trials, with 10 trials in each of three 
conditions (gain, loss, and neutral). Three practice trials took place before the gain and 
loss condition, and two practice trials before the neutral condition. The order in which 
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participants completed each condition was counterbalanced such that one-third of the 
participants completed the gain condition first, one-third the loss condition first, and one-
third the neutral condition. The critical card color for each set of five decks (e.g., red or 
yellow) was also counterbalanced between participants. Each condition consisted of two 
trials for each of the five ratios (1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 9:1). These trials were semi-randomly 
ordered such that each ratio appeared once in the first five trials, and once in the second 
five trials per condition.   
Materials 
Thirty card decks, each with 10 cards (6.3 x 8.8 cm), were used, one for each test 
trial. There were two colors of cards in each deck (one representing critical cards and the 
other color representing noncritical cards) in one of the following combinations:  red 
cards paired with yellow cards, pink and purple, orange and brown, black and white, blue 
and green, stripes and black polka-dots (both in black and white). Reference sheets (an 
8.5 x 11 inch piece of paper) were used in the practice trials for each condition to visually 
display the value of the critical card. A Lenovo Thinkpad laptop was used to keep track 
of participants’ responses.  
Procedure 
 Children and adults completed a single, one-on-one session, lasting approximately 
30-minutes for children and 20-minutes for adults. After obtaining written consent from 
adults and verbal consent from children, the experimenter sat opposite the participant at a 
small table and explained that they would be “playing a fun game” with decks of cards. 
The experimenter then led the participant through the practice trials and test trials for 
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each of the three conditions. Stickers were used as incentives for children and candy was 
used for adults. 
 Practice trials. Participants completed three practice trials before the gain and 
loss condition, and two before the neutral condition. Participants first learned that a deck 
is made up of cards that are one of two colors (“look this deck has orange and blue 
cards”). The practice trials always used a deck with a ratio of 4:6 because this ratio 
represents a minimal disparity in frequency and ensured that participants understood the 
rules related to both desirability and accuracy. The experimenter asked participants to 
help count how many critical and noncritical cards there were before the first practice 
trial, and reminded them of these numbers of each for subsequent practice trials. 
Reference sheets used for practice trials contained two squares representing the two 
colors used in the deck. 
In the first practice trial, the participant learned about the accuracy incentive. The 
experimenter explained that he/she was “going to shuffle the deck and pick a card 
without looking”, and that the participant got to say if he or she thinks “it was a blue card 
or an orange card”. The experimenter then pointed to the appropriate color on the 
reference sheet as he explained the rules. For this practice trial, a sticker was placed next 
to both colors on the reference sheet. If the prediction was correct, the participants 
learned that they earned a sticker (or candy, for adults). After the experimenter selected a 
card, reminded the participant of the ratio, and the participant made his or her guess, the 
identity of the card was revealed and the experimenter explained the result. If the 
prediction was correct, the experimenter explained that, “you get a sticker because you 
said it was going to be an orange one, and it was!” If the prediction was incorrect, the 
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experimenter explained that, “you don’t get a sticker this time, because you said it was 
going to be a blue one, but it wasn’t.” In either case, the experimenter reminded the 
participant of the opposite outcome (e.g., “If you had said it was a green one, you would 
have gotten a sticker because it is a green one.”).   
The next practice trial followed a similar procedure. In the second practice trial, 
participants learned that they get (for the gain condition) or lose (for the loss condition) a 
sticker if the critical card is drawn (“If it’s blue, you get/lose a sticker. If it’s green, you 
don’t get/lose one”). The reference was used as a visual reminder: The two colors of the 
deck being used appeared on the left, and the experimenter placed a sticker next to the 
color of the critical card in the gain and loss conditions. After explaining the value of the 
critical card, the experimenter reminded children how many of each color card there was, 
then shuffled the deck, placed the top card on the table, revealed the identity of the card 
and explained the outcome and its opposite (e.g., “Look, it’s a blue one! That means that 
you get/lose a sticker because it was a blue card and blue means you win/lose a sticker. If 
it was a green one, nothing would happen.”) Note that because the critical card was not 
associated with either a gain or a loss in the neutral condition, participants did not 
complete this practice trial in that condition.  
The final practice trial provided an opportunity for participants to combine the 
rules for making accurate predictions and for drawing a critical card. The experimenter, 
pointing to the reference sheet, first reminded participants that they could earn a reward 
for an accurate prediction (e.g., “So if you say it’s going to be a green one, and it is, you 
get a sticker. But if you say it will be green and it isn’t, then you don’t get a sticker.”). 
Then the experimenter reminded them of the critical card value (e.g., in the gain 
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condition, “Remember, you can also get a sticker if a blue card is drawn. So you can earn 
a sticker if you guess right, and you can earn another sticker if it’s a blue one.”). Note 
that in the neutral condition, participants learned that they would not get or lose anything 
if the critical card was drawn during this combination practice trial, and that the only way 
to earn a reward was with an accurate prediction.  
After the experimenter reminded the participants about the rules and the card 
ratios, he shuffled the deck, placed the top card on the table, face-down, and asked, “Do 
you think it is going to be a [color] card or a [other color] card?” The card was then 
revealed, and the experimenter asked the participant to explain the accuracy and critical 
card rules. For example, in the gain condition: “Look, it’s blue. You said it would be a 
green one but it’s not, so do you get a sticker for being right? No, you don’t get a sticker 
this time, because you guessed wrong. But remember that you can get a sticker another 
way too. Do you remember what color card you can get an extra sticker for? That’s right, 
you get an extra sticker if it’s a blue one, and it is, so you get a sticker for that! If it had 
been green, you would have gotten a sticker for being right, but you wouldn’t have gotten 
another sticker since it’s not blue.”  
If participants failed to repeat the rules back to the experimenter correctly, the 
experimenter corrected them and repeated the same practice trial. If the participant 
continued to misunderstand the rules, the experimenter thanked them for participating 
and offered them a thank-you gift.  
 Test trials. Next, participants completed a total of 10 test trials, blocked into two 
sets of five trials (one trial for each of the five ratios: 1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 9:1). The first set 
of five trials used one color combination (e.g., blue and green cards) and the second set of 
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trials used a second color combination (e.g., red and yellow cards). The color of the 
critical card was counterbalanced across participants, and the five trials within each of the 
two blocks were randomly ordered.  
The test trials proceeded in much the same way as the third practice trial. To 
begin, the experimenter explained that this time, he was going to “change how many blue 
and green cards we have.” As in the practice trials, participants helped count the number 
of each type of card. Before each trial, the experimenter repeated the rules and the ratio of 
cards: “So there are nine blue ones and one green one this time. Remember, you can get a 
sticker if you are right about which card it is, and you can also get/lose a sticker if it’s a 
blue one (or – “and guessing correctly is the only way to get a sticker” – in the neutral 
condition).” Reference sheets were not provided for test trials because their use would 
have made critical card and accuracy information unequally salient. 
Participants predicted which card would be drawn and the experimenter entered 
their predictions into the computer program. In the traditional marked card paradigm, 
adults were not given feedback because of its potential to influence participants’ 
subsequent predictions. In order to modify the paradigm to cater to children’s limited 
attention span, feedback on the total number of stickers participants either gained or lost 
was provided to all participants after every five trials.  
 After 10 test trials, children were given the chance to take a 5-minute break. This 
break was offered to ensure that they were not getting bored or fatigued. Only two 
children took a break. Both did so after the second set of 10 test trials and this time was 
spent doing a fun but cognitively undemanding task (e.g., jumping jacks, bouncing a 
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ball). After the break, participants continued with the practice trials for the next 
condition.  
 Quantitative comparison. After participants completed all practice and test 
trials, the experimenter asked them to indicate which color card was most frequent in 
three different decks. This measure was used to ensure that participants (particularly 
children) were sensitive to information about card ratios. Recall that understanding and 
considering probability information is important because it allows for a clearer 
interpretation of participants’ predictions.  
The experimenter used three red/yellow card decks with 1:9, 4:6, and 5:5 
respective ratios. These ratios were selected because they represent each ratio used in the 
paradigm without the reversal of the 1:9 and 4:6 ratios. Participants helped the 
experimenter count how many of each color cards there were in the deck and then 
determined if there were more of one type of card than the other type or if there were the 
same number of each card.  
Results 
To analyze the results, predicting a critical card was scored as a “1” and 
predicting a noncritical card predictions was scored as a “0”. There was a prediction 
made in block one and in block two for each of the five deck frequencies. The block one 
and two responses were averaged to create a composite score. Thus, each participant had 
a total of fifteen composite scores, five for each frequency in each of the three conditions. 
For example, a participant who predicted a critical card for the 1:9 ratio deck in the first 
block of the gain condition and a noncritical card for 1:9 deck in the second block of the 
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gain condition would have a composite score for .5 for the 1:9 ratio deck in the gain 
condition.  
Preliminary analyses showed no effects involving gender, F(2, 117) = 0.68, p = 
.51, 
2
p  = .01, child age (4- or 5-years-old), F(2, 57) = 0.12, p = .89, 
2
p  
 = .01, or the 
order in which participants completed each condition (gain first, loss first, or neutral 
first), F(2, 117) = 2.09, p = .13, 
2
p  = .03. These factors were not considered in further 
analyses.  
There was missing data from 11 (six 4-year-olds and five 5-year-olds) of the 60 
children in the second block of test trials for one or more conditions. All stopped due to 
boredom, a lack of focus, or a combination of both. A 3(Desirability: gain, neutral, loss) x 
5(Frequency: 1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 9:1) x 2(Block: block 1, block 2) repeated measures 
ANOVA showed that, for children who completed both blocks, there was no main effect 
of block, F(1, 48) = 1.52, p = .22, 
2
p  = .03, or an interaction between block and 
desirability, F(2, 47) = 0.61, p = .55, 
2
p
 = .03. Therefore, for the analyses reported 
below, block one predictions made by children who did not complete both blocks were 
used in place of the composite score. To be conservative, all analyses were run with 
and without the children who were missing block two data. Results did not differ 
between the two samples so only results from analyses on the the full dataset are 
reported. 
Hypothesis 1: Children’s Desirability Bias 
Of primary interest was to determine if children exhibited a DB. Figure 1 shows 
the percentage of times that children predicted the critical card as a function of its 
AGAINST THE ODDS  33 
 
 
 
frequency for each of the three conditions. Collapsing across frequencies, children 
predicted the critical card 67.5% (SD = 0.03) of the time when it was desirable (gain a 
sticker), 48.3% (SD = 0.03) of the time when it was neutral, and 26.3% (SD = 0.03) of the 
time when it was undesirable (lose a sticker).  
A 3(Desirability: gain, loss, neutral) x 5(Frequency: 1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 9:1) 
repeated measures ANOVA using children’s composite scores confirmed hypothesis one: 
There was a significant main effect of desirability, F(2, 58) = 41.09, p < .001, 
2
p
 = .59. 
Children were more likely to predict the critical card in the gain condition than the 
neutral (p < .001) and loss (p < .001) conditions. They were also more likely to predict 
the critical card in the neutral condition than in the loss condition (p < .001). In other 
words, children’s predictions were inflated by the desirable outcomes and diminished by 
undesirable outcomes.  
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare the difference between 
children’s predictions made in the gain and neutral conditions and the difference between 
predictions made in the loss and neutral conditions. The difference between children’s 
predictions made in the gain (M = 0.19, SD = 0.30) and loss (M = 0.22, SD = 0.29) 
condition compared to the neutral condition was not significant, t(59) = -0.47, p = .64, d 
= 0.10. In other words, children were just as biased to predict the critical card when it was 
associated with a gain as they were to not predict it when it was associated with a loss. 
Importantly, Figure 2 shows that children were sensitive to the frequency of 
critical and noncritical cards across all five deck ratios, F(4, 56) = 5.78, p = .001, 
2
p
 = 
.29. Collapsing across desirability condition, children were more likely to predict a 
critical card to be drawn as the number of critical cards in a deck increased. This pattern 
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suggests that the children took the frequency of critical and noncritical cards into account 
before making their predictions. 
The interaction between the desirability of the critical card and its frequency was 
not significant, F(8, 52) = 0.70, p = .69, 
2
p
 = .10 for children. As demonstrated in Figure 
1, the strength of the DB, indicated by the difference between the gain and loss 
conditions, did not differ by critical card frequency.  
Individual patterns of responding were consistent with the reported results. Fifty 
of the 60 children predicted more critical cards when they stood to gain a sticker than 
when they stood to lose a sticker. In contrast, only 5 of the 60 children did the opposite 
and 5 showed no difference.  
Hypothesis 2: Comparison of the Desirability Bias in Children and Adults 
A second goal of this research was to determine if there was a difference in the 
strength of the DB between children and adults. Adults were first analyzed separately, 
and then compared to children. Figure 1 shows the percentage of time that adults 
predicted the critical card as a function of its frequency for each of the three conditions. 
Collapsing across critical card frequencies, adults predicted the critical card 59.8% (SD = 
.02) of the time when it was desirable (gain a point), 47.8% (SD = .01) of the time when 
it was neutral, and 47.8% (SD = .02) of the time when it was undesirable (lose a point). 
A 3(Desirability: gain, loss, neutral) x 5(Frequency: 1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 9:1) 
ANOVA using composite scores confirmed that adults showed a main effect of 
desirability, F(2, 58) = 16.36, p < .001, 
2
p
 = .55 and frequency, F(4, 56) = 1,052.97, p < 
.001, 
2
p
 = .99. As in previous research with adults using the traditional marked card 
paradigm, there was a significant interaction between desirability and frequency, F(4, 56) 
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= 4.58, p < .001, 
2
p
 =  .55, revealing that the DB was stronger for the 5:5 frequency than 
any of the other frequencies. These results show that the modified marked card paradigm 
used in the present study replicated the overall desirability effect found in prior research 
that used the traditional marked card paradigm. This step was crucial because it suggested 
that the version of the marked card paradigm used for this study could validly compare 
children’s responses to those of adults.  
A paired-samples t-test was conducted to compare the difference between adult’s 
predictions made in the gain and neutral conditions and the difference between 
predictions made in the loss and neutral conditions. Overall, the difference between 
adults’ predictions made in the gain (M = 0.12, SD = 0.16) and loss (M = 0.00, SD = 0.20) 
condition compared to the neutral condition was significant, t(59) = 3.39, p = .001, d = 
0.66. In other words, the strength of adults’ bias differed by condition: They were more 
swayed by their desired outcome in the gain condition than in the loss condition.  
A closer look at the desirability main effect, using pairwise comparisons, showed 
that adults, like children, predicted the critical card in the gain condition more often than 
they did in the loss condition (p = .004) or neutral condition (p < .001). However, unlike 
children, adults predicted the critical card in the loss condition as often as they did in the 
neutral condition (p = 1.00). This result is interesting because in the traditional marked 
card paradigm, adults typically overpredict the critical card in the gain condition to the 
same extent that they underpredict the critical card in the loss condition (e.g., Irwin, 
1953; Irwin & Metzger, 1966; Irwin & Snodgrass, 1966; Windschitl et al., 2010, study 1). 
Thus, although the modified marked card paradigm used in the present study replicated 
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the overall DB, caution must be used in interpreting a comparison across ages, 
specifically for the loss condition.  
In order to directly compare children’s responses to those of adults, a 
3(Desirability: gain, loss, neutral) x 5(Frequency: 1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 9:1) x 2 (Age group: 
children, adults) ANOVA was conducted with age group as a between-subjects variable. 
There was a significant interaction between desirability and age group, F(2, 117) = 15.75, 
p < .001 , 
2
p
 =  .21. Specifically, children were more influenced by the desirability of the 
critical cards than adults were. Pairwise comparisons revealed that children predicted the 
critical card more often than did adults in the gain condition, (p = .03). Similarly, children 
predicted the critical card less often than did adults in the loss condition, (p < .001). 
These results suggest that, as hypothesized, children have a stronger bias than adults. 
Children’s reliance on frequency information was different than adults’. As 
demonstrated in Figure 2, a significant interaction between frequency and age group, F(4, 
115) = 72.8, p < .001 , 
2
p
 =  .72, emerged. Pairwise comparisons showed that adults 
were more likely than children to predict a critical card in decks containing more critical 
than noncritical cards (6 critical: 4 noncritical, p < .001 and 9 critical: 1 noncritical, p < 
.001). Similarly, adults were less likely to predict a critical card in decks containing fewer 
critical than noncritical cards (4:6, p < .001 and 1:9, p < .001). In other words, adults 
made more use of the frequency differences than children when making predictions. 
Predictions did not differ between the two age groups for decks with 5:5 (p = .50) ratio, 
suggesting that both children and adults understood that there were no probability 
differences for these decks. 
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Additional Findings 
Participants were asked to identify which color card was more frequent in each of 
three different decks at the end of the procedure in order to provide a second measure of 
(mostly children’s) sensitivity to frequency. None of the children answered zero 
questions correctly, three answered one question correctly, 22 answered two questions 
correctly, and 35 answered all three questions correctly. This distribution is significantly 
greater than what would be expected by chance (15 children in each category), X2 (3, N = 
60) = 56.4, p < .001, Yate’s correction for continuity applied. These results show that 
most children could determine which color was more frequent. All of the adults answered 
these questions correctly.  
A 3(Desirability: gain, loss, neutral) x 5(Frequency: 1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 9:1) x 
2(Quantitative Comparison: three correct, two or fewer correct) ANOVA was conducted 
determine if there was a relationship between the number of frequency questions 
answered correctly and the strength of the DB in children. For this analysis, children who 
correctly answered all three questions were included in one group and children who 
missed one or more question were included in the other. The analysis revealed a 
significant interaction between numeracy and desirability condition, F(2, 57) = 5.06, p = 
.009, 
2
p
 =  .15. Specifically, children who correctly answered all three frequency 
questions exhibited a weaker DB than children who missed at least one question. 
However, when only the 35 children who answered all three questions correctly were 
compared to adults, these children still showed a stronger DB, F(2, 93) = 5.46, p = .001, 
2
p
 = .11. In other words, even the children who were the most number conscious were 
more biased than adults. 
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Finally, a 3(Desirability: gain, neutral, loss) x 5(Frequency: 1:9, 4:6, 5:5, 6:4, 9:1) 
x 2(Position: left first, right first) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted separately 
for children and adults to ensure that the critical card position (and color) did not impact 
participants’ predictions. Results showed no significant interaction between critical card 
position and desirability for adults, F(2, 57) = 0.20, p = .82, 
2
p
 =  .01, indicating that the 
position and color of the critical card did not influence their predictions. Children’s 
predictions were significantly different depending on the critical card position, F(2, 57) = 
3.70, p = .03, 
2
p
 =  .12. Children were more likely to predict a critical card when it was 
located on the left for the first block of test trials (orange cards) and when it was located 
on the right for the second block (polka-dotted cards), however this was only the case in 
the neutral condition (p < .001). For unknown reasons, children were more likely to 
predict orange cards to be drawn over brown ones and polka-dotted cards to be drawn 
over striped ones. Nevertheless, children’s predictions in the neutral condition reflected a 
sensitivity to critical card frequency. 
Discussion 
The DB has been found repeatedly with adults using the classic marked card 
paradigm (Budescu & Bruderman, 1995; Windschitl et al., 2010). The present study is 
the first to show the same bias in children as young as four years of age using a modified, 
child-friendly version of the paradigm. As hypothesized, 4- and 5-year-old children 
exhibited a stronger desirability bias than adults, especially when faced with a loss. 
Interestingly, adults showed a bias only when they stood to gain a reward but not when 
they stood to lose one. Several artifactual and theoretical explanations for why children 
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might show a bias in the first place, and why their bias is stronger than adults’ are 
considered.  
Recall that, in order to make optimal predictions in the marked card paradigm, 
children should have predicted whichever type of card was most frequent and ignored the 
desirability associated with drawing either type of card. But the 4- and 5-year olds in this 
study had difficulty making optimal predictions; instead, the objective probability 
information was overshadowed by the (un)desirability of the critical card. Children 
tended to overpredict the critical card when it was associated with the gain of a sticker 
and underpredict it when it was associated with a loss, and they did so to the same extent 
when compared to a neutral condition.  
Although a direct comparison between the children in the present study and the 9- 
and 11-year-olds used in Marks’ (1951) original study is not possible due to important 
procedural differences, it still informative to visually compare the data from the critical 
card frequencies shared between the two studies (1:9, 5:5, & 9:1). For the 1:9 critical to 
noncritical card ratio, the older children from Marks’ study predicted a critical card, on 
average, 47% of the time when it resulted in a gain and 0% of the time when it resulted in 
a loss, whereas the children in the present study predicted a critical card 53% of the time 
when it resulted in a gain and 16.7% of the time when it resulted in a loss. Similarly, for 
the 5:5 ratio, older children predicted a critical card 90% of the time when it resulted in a 
gain and 14% of the time when it resulted in a loss, where younger children predicted one 
73% of the time when it resulted in a gain and 28% of the time when it resulted in a loss. 
Finally, for the 9:1 ratio, older children predicted a critical card to be drawn 100% of the 
time when it resulted in a gain and 56% of the time when it resulted in a loss, whereas 
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younger children predicted one 78% of the time when it resulted in a gain and 29% of the 
time when it resulted in a loss. These numbers suggest that the magnitude of the 
desirability bias, quantified by the difference between critical card predictions in the gain 
and loss conditions, was fairly similar for younger and older children. Interestingly, the 
older children in Marks’ original study were more sensitive to the frequency of critical 
cards in a deck than children in the present study. Compared to the adults in the present 
study, however, children in both ages were less sensitive to frequency. This difference in 
the extent to which children consider frequency information may help to explain the 
difference in the strength of the DB between children and adults.  
One artifactual explanation for children’s bias is that they did not understand the 
frequency information presented to them. There are two reasons to discount this 
explanation. First, results showed that children were increasingly likely to predict a 
critical card as the number of critical cards in a deck increased. Second, at the end of the 
study the majority of children correctly indicated which of two colors was more frequent 
in three different decks and only 5 children got two or more incorrect. Thus, there is clear 
evidence that children paid attention to the probability information during the study and 
used it when considering how to respond.  
Given past research on young children’s numeracy, the fact that children were 
capable of using probability information was not particularly surprising (e.g., Kushnir & 
Gopnik, 2005; Ma & Xu, 2011; Xu & Garcia, 2008;). Even infants as young as 6-months 
old are capable of detecting when there is more or less of something and of using that 
information to guide their predictions. In one study, for example, infants saw a box of 
ping-pong balls, 80% of which were red and 20% of which were white (Xu & Garcia, 
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2008). When an experimenter closed her eyes and randomly drew five balls out of the 
box, infants were surprised if she drew an unlikely sample, such as four white balls and 
one red ball, as indicated by the length of their gaze. They were not surprised when she 
drew a more likely one, such as four red balls and one white ball.  
In addition, two modifications were purposefully made to the modified marked 
card paradigm used in the present study in order to make the number of critical and 
noncritical cards particularly salient for children. First, children counted the number of 
both types of cards in each deck with the experimenter and second, the experimenter 
reminded the participant of these frequencies right before they made each prediction. 
These same modifications may have influenced adults’ responses in the loss condition, 
which is discussed below. What was impressive in the present study was that, despite the 
intentional emphasis on probability and children’s apparent sensitivity to this 
information, children were still strongly influenced by the (un)desirability of the critical 
card.  
Adults also showed a desirability bias, but, unlike the children in this study and 
adults from previous studies, the bias was only present in the gain condition. Adults in 
previous research using the traditional marked card paradigm appear to be influenced by 
desirability to the same extent in both the loss and gain conditions (Irwin, 1953; Irwin & 
Metzger, 1966; Irwin & Snodgrass, 1966; Windschitl et al., 2010, study 1). One reason 
for the unexpected finding in the loss condition is that adults developed a new hedging-
their-bets strategy for minimizing loss. The reason they might have been able to do so in 
the present study but not in previous studies is twofold. First, the cognitive load was 
reduced which could have enabled them to formulate and use such a strategy, and second, 
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the point they could earn for being accurate could offset the loss of a point from drawing 
a critical card.  
In the loss condition, participants could earn one point for making an accurate 
prediction but could also lose one point if the critical card were drawn. For example, 
participants who correctly predicted a critical card in a deck of four critical and six 
noncritical cards would gain a point for accuracy and lose a point for drawing a critical 
card. In other words, if they made an accurate prediction, the point they could earn for 
being right would offset the point they would lose for drawing a critical card. Hedging 
their bets ensured that they would not lose anything, while also making it impossible to 
gain anything. The same strategy is not relevant in the gain condition because participants 
could only earn points, they could not lose anything. As the data show, adults were still 
biased for predictions involving potential gains. In past studies, the accuracy incentive 
was worth only one-quarter of what participants stood to lose, so a hedging-your-bet 
strategy would not have been relevant because the accuracy incentive could not fully 
offset the value of the critical card. 
Although inadvertent, this finding is interesting because previous research has 
shown that stressing accuracy to the participants or providing them with physical 
accuracy incentives did not seem to alter the desirability bias (e.g., Budescu & 
Bruderman, 1995; Crandall et al., 1955). Indeed, a meta-analysis has shown that effect 
sizes did not differ between studies that offered incentives for or stressed the importance 
of being accurate and studies that did neither (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007b). Because it 
was believed that incentives mattered little in terms of eliciting a bias, the accuracy 
incentive in the present study was worth just as much as the prediction incentive. This 
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helped increase its salience for young children and was simply more convenient (stickers 
and candy are not as easy to fractionalize as monetary incentives).  
However, the present study suggests that the strength of the desirability bias, at 
least in the loss condition, can be shifted by how valuable the accuracy incentive is 
relative to the desirability of the critical card (or perhaps how salient the accuracy 
incentive is; see Vosgerau, 2010 for a discussion). A closer look at research on the effect 
of accuracy incentives shows that it has not been widely studied – only 27 individual 
studies were included in the meta-analysis that examined the effects of accuracy 
incentives (Krizan & Windschitl, 2007b), and only 19 used a version of the marked card 
paradigm. It is possible that these incentives matter more than previously thought. One 
study suggests that small incentives used with the marked card paradigm do not influence 
subjective probabilities, or people’s estimates of the general likelihood of an outcome 
occurring (subjective probabilities are typically reported as a percentage chance). Instead, 
the researchers argued that incentives might influence prediction thresholds – the 
evidence required to predict one dichotomous outcome over another (Price & Marquez, 
2005, as cited in Krizan & Windschitl, 2007b). Thus, accuracy incentives may have more 
of an impact on dichotomous predictions, like those made in this study, than on 
subjective probability estimates. 
In addition to increasing the relative value of accuracy, the cognitive load was 
dramatically reduced in order to make the paradigm accessible to children. Unlike in the 
traditional marked card task, adults in this study had the rules broken down into parts 
accompanied by several practice trials, had all the trials for a given condition presented in 
succession rather than randomly, and were reminded of the rules before each prediction. 
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Reducing the cognitive load was necessary to create a task that would allow for a 
comparison by age, but it may have provided an opportunity for adults to reason 
differently about their predictions. Given the change in accuracy incentive, many adults 
likely ended up developing a new strategy for minimizing losses.  
In order to explore whether the hedging hypothesis had legs, a subset of 19 of the 
adult participants were asked one to two follow up questions (unsystematically) at the 
end of the study. They were first asked if that they had used a different strategy when the 
critical card resulted in a loss than when it resulted in a gain. If they answered yes, they 
were then asked to explain the difference in strategy in an open-ended response. Twelve 
of the 19 adults reported using the hedging strategy.  
These exploratory data are the basis for a new study that is currently investigating 
whether the increased accuracy incentives were the reason behind adults’ use of a loss-
aversive strategy for potential losses. The procedure is identical to the present study 
except that the value of the critical card is increased to four times the accuracy incentive 
(four points are lost for drawing the critical card, and one point is won for accuracy), as it 
has been in previous studies with adults. In this case, a hedging strategy would not work 
because being accurate would not offset the potential loss of drawing a critical card. 
Response patterns in the loss condition would likely be more similar to previous studies 
in this case, but children would still be expected show a stronger bias in the loss 
condition (as they do in the present study).   
It is worth speculating about theoretical reasons for why adults did not show a 
desirability bias in the loss condition. One speculation is that adults are more loss-averse 
than are children. In the marked card paradigm, adults were willing to forsake the optimal 
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amount of points they could have earned in order to ensure that they did not lose 
anything. In contrast, children were more willing to risk losing something because they 
were more optimistic that the undesirable outcome would not occur.  
There is abundant literature that supports loss aversion in adults. In a variety of 
circumstances, adults show more sensitivity to losses than they do to gains (Harbaugh et 
al., 2002; Johnson et al., 2007; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Kahneman et al., 1991; 
Steelandt et al., 2013; Tom et al., 2007). People who lose money if they failed to reach a 
weight loss goal, for example, have been found to be more likely to lose weight than are 
those who earn money for achieving the same goal (Driver & Hensrud, 2013). Similarly, 
adults who possess an item, and therefore have the possibility to lose it, place more value 
on the item than they do if they don’t own it, a phenomenon known as the endowment 
effect (Thaler, 1980). Given their sensitivity to loss, it is actually a bit surprising that 
adults who have completed the traditional, computerized version of the marked card 
paradigm do not show a reduced desirability bias in the loss condition.  
 The fact that children exhibited a desirability bias in the loss condition coincides 
with previous work indicating that children are less sensitive to negative information than 
positive information when making judgments about others (Boseovski & Lee, 2006, 
2008, Rholes & Ruble, 1986). In one study for instance, preschoolers required five times 
more evidence of another child being mean to consider them a bad person than evidence 
of another child being nice to consider them a good person (Boseovski & Lee, 2006). In 
the marked card paradigm, children’s predictions in the loss condition reflected this 
decreased sensitivity to negative information. Children, unlike adults, were willing to 
take risks that opened them up to a potential loss in order to gain a reward. Future 
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research should explore how the value of the accuracy incentive relative to the value of 
the critical card influences the desirability bias. 
 Another question for speculation is whether the processes that have been 
hypothesized to underlie adults’ desirability bias are the same processes that underlie the 
bias in children. Signal detection theory and the biased-guessing account are two 
explanations for why adults,’ and potentially children’s, desires influence their 
judgments, even when they are incentivized to be accurate. Windschitl et al., (2010) 
provide a review of several other accounts that seem less likely mechanisms for the bias 
for adults and are not discussed as possibilities to explain children’s bias here.  
Signal detection is the ability to correctly indicate when a signal is present (a 
“hit”) or not (a “correct rejection”). Saying a signal is present when it is not is considered 
a “false alarm” while saying it is absent when it is present is a “miss.” In the marked card 
paradigm, predicting a critical card when one ends up being drawn would be considered a 
“hit.” Participants might place more importance on getting “hits” when it is associated 
with a gain, and therefore de-emphasize probability information. In other words, the 
threshold for predicting a desirable outcome based on probability is lowered from 
baseline. Predicting a critical card when it is not actually drawn would be considered a 
“false alarm.” According to this account, in the marked card paradigm participants might 
place more emphasis on avoiding “false alarms” in the loss condition (Tanner & Swets, 
1954). That is, the threshold for predicting when an undesired outcome based on 
probability is increased from baseline. Adjusting the threshold up (for gains) or down (for 
losses) would lead to a greater number of predictions that go against the odds.  
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 A related explanation, called the biased-guessing account, suggests that the 
desirability bias in adults results from a weighted guessing process. This account posits 
that individuals assess probability information but make a prediction that goes against 
this information because of the possibility of a less probable but more desirable outcome 
occurring (Windschitl et al., 2010). Furthermore, it specifies that adults exhibit a 
desirability bias due to their belief that part of their prediction is arbitrary because it takes 
the form of a guess. When this arbitrary guessing element is removed by making 
likelihood estimates (i.e., what is the likelihood of an outcome occurring) instead of 
dichotomous predictions, the desirability bias vanishes (Windschitl et al., 2010). This 
account explains why adults tend to show a desirability bias when the number of critical 
and noncritical cards are similar (e.g., 4:6) and do not show a bias when they are very 
different (e.g., 1:9). For decks with similar frequencies of cards, a desirable but unlikely 
outcome is only slightly less likely to occur than an undesirable outcome. This leads 
adults to be more likely to predict a desirable outcome for this type of deck than for a 
deck in which a desirable outcome is much less likely than an undesirable one. 
Like signal detection theory, the biased-guessing account can potentially explain 
why adults, as well as children, predict desirable outcomes despite understanding that 
they are unlikely. The primary difference between the two can be seen in a hypothetical 
example involving a deck with four red cards and six yellow cards where the red (critical) 
card automatically results in a gain. For this deck, signal detection theory would assert 
that an individual would use a criterion for whether or not they would be willing to 
predict the desirable but unlikely outcome (a red card), and would thus make this 
prediction every time when facing this specific deck. The biased-guessing account, 
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however, would involve the individual realizing that a red card would be drawn 40% of 
the time, and therefore result in him or her predicting the desirable but unlikely outcome 
some of the time, but not always.  
 In addition to the two mechanisms discussed, there are a number of other theories, 
such as the biased-threshold and biased-evaluation accounts (see Windschitl et al., 2010), 
about why adults make biased predictions. The present study cannot draw strong 
conclusions about which process is leading children to make biased predictions, but the 
biased-guessing approach appears more likely because, while children frequently 
predicted desirable but unlikely outcomes, they did not appear to use a consistent 
threshold when making these predictions. 
A deeper question than what mechanism causes biased predictions would be why 
children or adults would want to make predictions that go against probability in the first 
place, when they stand to gain the most and lose the least when they base predictions on 
the odds alone? Whether the bias has roots in biased-guessing, signal detection theory, or 
something else, why might the desirability bias or other forms of optimistic reasoning 
exist, and why do these biases appear to be enhanced in children?   
Given that children seem to have a stronger bias than adults, one suggestion is 
that being overly optimistic is an adaptive and perhaps even an inborn tendency. It might 
be adaptive to focus on what you want rather than what is likely to occur at first. The bias 
is then perhaps reduced as a result of socialization processes (e.g., being overconfident 
about your own performance may be seen as immodest) and experience (e.g., not getting 
what you want) or interfered with by other competing information (e.g. moral judgments 
about “losing”).  
AGAINST THE ODDS  49 
 
 
 
Imagine an infant first learning to sit up. The infant tries, and fails repeatedly, 
perhaps hundreds of times, before having any success. If the infant were to predict 
whether or not, on the next try, they would succeed or fail, the odds would point to 
failure. But if infants believed they would fail, the motivation to continue trying might 
decline and they would perhaps never achieve this important milestone. Many kinds of 
developmental achievement, indeed perhaps even survival in the beginning, may depend 
in part on an infant’s willingness to ignore the odds in favor of optimism. For adults, 
however, it might pay to be somewhat pessimistic, or at least realistic, at times.      
If biased reasoning, specifically the desirability bias, is an innate or adaptive 
tendency, then it should be present very early in life, at least to the extent that perspective 
taking or mentalizing (understanding others’ mental lives) is not involved. One way to 
test for this bias in infants would be to borrow a paradigm from the infant numeracy 
literature. In such a procedure, infants would first be shown a sample of blue and red 
marbles. In a habituation period, drawing a blue marble could be made desirable for 
infants by pairing the display of a blue marble with the appearance of a cheerful, positive 
stimulus. In contrast, drawing a blue marble could be made undesirable by pairing it with 
the removal of the positive stimulus. The ratio of blue to red marbles could be 
manipulated and time spent looking at a randomly drawn marble would determine the 
extent to which infant’s desire (or lack thereof) for a blue marble influenced their 
expectations. This procedure would necessarily involve giving feedback, something that 
was not done in the marked card paradigm. This could be accounted for, however, by 
using a single-trial design and increasing sample size. Like the marked card paradigm, 
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this procedure mimics the type of games in which the desirability bias seems to be most 
robust.  
 Optimistic thinking persists under a variety of circumstances, at least into middle 
childhood. Preschoolers believe that they will jump substantially further than they ever 
have in any previous practice trials, even though they understand that their previous 
jumping distance is a good predictor of their future jumping distance (Schneider, 1998). 
4-year-olds optimistically predict that they will remember picture pairs better than they 
actually do (Lipko et al., 2009, study 1) and 4-year-olds predict that they will be able to 
improve their performance for a simple skill-based game even when the task had 
previously been designed to ensure that participants would fail (Stipek et al., 1984). In all 
of these circumstances one could argue that children’s optimism is adaptive: Believing 
they can perform a task better than they ever have before or that what they desire is what 
they can expect may help children persevere even after experiencing failure or sub-
optimal experiences time and time again.   
Strategic optimism is important for adults as well. Being optimistic about landing 
that desirable graduate school position or dream job after failing to do so the last several 
times, and despite knowing how many applicants typically apply for the limited number 
of opportunities, may help keep the applicant from landing instead in a pit of depression. 
Abundant research has shown that optimistic thinking confers a wide range of benefits 
including better physical and mental health, more successful relationships, higher self-
esteem, better coping and stress management skills, and more energy compared to people 
who tend to have pessimistic styles of thinking (see Carver, Scheier & Segerstrom, 2010, 
for a review).  
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But with experience, adults learn that in some circumstances, like when gambling 
in a casino (e.g., Gibson & Sanbonmatsu, 2004), being pessimistic might be more ideal 
than being optimistic. Being strategically pessimistic can protect against intense 
disappointment by diminishing the value of a particular outcome. Krizan and Windschitl 
(2007a; 2007b) suggest that strategic pessimism in adults seems to occur most frequently 
when outcomes are not within one’s own control (e.g., Shepperd, Findley-Klein, 
Kwavnick, Walker, & Perez, 2000; Taylor & Shepperd, 1998). Since adults did not have 
any control of the random card drawn in the marked card paradigm, strategic pessimism 
could help to explain why adults developed a loss-prevention strategy for facing 
potentially undesirable outcomes. According to one study, children’s degree of optimism 
tends to look more like adults’ (who are more realistic) during middle childhood 
(Lockhart et al., 2002). It would be interesting to test children ages 10- to 13-years in the 
marked card paradigm to explore whether this shift towards realism occurs at about the 
same time as when children’s desirability bias looks more like adults’.  
Another intriguing possibility for why children show a more pronounced bias than 
adults in the present study has to do with children’s tendency to engage in magical 
thinking. Magical thinking refers to attributing a causal relationship between two events 
that could not reasonably be causally related. For example, one study showed preschool-
aged children a box with crumpled postage stamp inside (Subbotsky, 2004). An 
experimenter closed the box, said some magic words, and then opened the box again to 
reveal a new, non-crumpled stamp (a hidden trap door was used to switch the stamps). 
Out of 4-, 6-, and 9-year-olds, only 4- and 6-year-olds accepted the experimenter’s 
explanation that this was the same stamp they had earlier seen crumpled up, but had 
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transformed due to magic. 4- and 6-year-olds were also more likely than 9-year-olds to 
offer a magical explanation when given a chance to explain the phenomenon on their 
own.  
In another study, 6-year-olds indicated that if someone had a missing finger, they 
could grow it back if they wanted it to badly enough (Lockhart et al., 2002). Despite 
knowing that fingers do not normally grow back, children’s belief that magical powers 
can make wishes come true led them to make optimistic predictions about a biologically 
impossible event. In other words, young children are willing offer impossible 
explanations for seemingly impossible events, especially when the outcome is something 
desirable. For children completing the marked card paradigm, predicting an unlikely 
outcome might make perfect sense simply because, to them, the outcome of the random 
card draw is susceptible to what can be thought of as “magical intervention.” Adults, who 
have lost the “magic” of childhood, would not likely consider magic as having anything 
to do with future outcomes. 
One final explanation for children’s more pronounced bias is due to a cognitive 
issue called feature binding. Feature binding is when individual pieces of information are 
integrated and remembered together. This process requires attention and working 
memory. Because of the cognitive requirement, young adults are better at it than both 
children and older adults (e.g., Cowen, Naveh-Benjamin, Kilb & Saults, 2006).  
Remembering a blue circle from independently coded features (blue object, circle) is one 
example of feature binding, but the concept applies to integrating the separate features of 
the marked card paradigm as well (see Hommell, 2004, for a review).  
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In the marked card paradigm, the independent features are the probability 
information and the value of the critical card. In the present study, children were more 
sensitive to probability in the neural, compared to the gain or loss condition. Children 
also based their predictions the value of the critical card for the 5:5 critical card ratios 
when probability information is ambiguous (they show a desirability bias even though 
there is an equal chance of drawing either type of card). Although children can remember 
both pieces of information individually, they may have more difficulty compared to 
adults at combining the two features because of the cognitive requirements. Similarly, 
one reason why adults may not have shown a bias in the loss condition is because they 
were better able to integrate both pieces of information due to the reduced cognitive 
demands of the modified marked card paradigm. One study provides some support for 
this hypothesis. Five-and 6-year-olds and adults had to predict which of two kids broke a 
window based on the testimony of two witnesses. Both children and adults had no 
difficulty basing their predictions on how accurate the witnesses were in one study or on 
how confident they were in a second study. But when required to use both the accuracy 
and confidence of the witness, children ignored accuracy whereas adults considered both 
features (Tenney, Small, Kondrad, Jaswal, & Spellman, 2011). When the adults were 
placed under additional cognitive demands, they, like children, downplayed one feature 
in favor of another.  
It would be interesting to explore further whether cognitive demands can push the 
strength of the desirability bias up or down. One way to do so while maintaining the 
ability to compare across age groups is to use the modified marked card paradigm but ask 
adults to complete a secondary task simultaneously. Another interesting possibility is to 
AGAINST THE ODDS  54 
 
 
 
test older adults. Older adults’ desirability bias should look more like children’s if this 
feature binding account is valid. Feature binding abilities take a U-shaped function by 
age, with older adults and children performing worse than younger adults (e.g., Chalfonte 
& Johnson, 1996). In addition, older adults, like children, tend to have a positivity bias 
(Charles, Mather, & Carstensen, 2003; Mather & Carstensen, 2005).  
 The present study was the first to look for and successfully find a DB in 
preschool-age children. In order to do so, a child-friendly version of the marked card 
paradigm was created to test both children and adults. Results suggest that children have 
a stronger DB than adults in both the loss and gain conditions. Adults did not show a bias 
in the loss condition, possibly because of the reduced cognitive demands of the task and 
the relative value of the accuracy incentive. These results can provide a framework for 
understanding the development of other biases such as overoptimism and overconfidence. 
This research is the first to broaden this specific area of developmental literature by 
demonstrating what many parents would claim to have known from experience: Children 
expect to get what they want even when they understand that it is clearly unlikely.
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Figure 1. Critical card predictions by frequency of critical card for children and adults. 
Children were more likely to predict a critical card in the gain condition compared to the 
loss and neutral conditions and were less likely to predict a critical card in the loss 
condition compared to the neutral condition. Adults were more likely to predict a critical 
card in the gain condition compared to the loss and neutral conditions but were no less 
likely to predict a critical card in the loss condition compared to the neutral condition.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 4 5 6 9
C
ri
ti
ca
l 
C
ar
d
 P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s 
(i
n
 %
)
Critical Card Frequency (out of 10)
Children
Gain
Neutral
Loss
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1 4 5 6 9
C
ri
ti
ca
l 
C
ar
d
 P
re
d
ic
ti
o
n
s 
(i
n
 %
)
Critical Card Frequency (out of 10)
Adults
Gain
Neutral
Loss
AGAINST THE ODDS  66 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Critical card predictions by frequency of critical card for adults and children. 
When collapsed across condition, critical card predictions increased as the number of 
critical cards increased for both adults and children. Compared to children, adults were 
less likely to predict a critical card for frequencies of one and four and more likely to 
predict a critical for frequencies of six and nine.
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